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Abstract
The ﬂow logic approach to static analysis amounts to specifying the admissibility of solutions to analysis
problems; when speciﬁed using formulae in stratiﬁed alternation-free least ﬁxed point logic one may use
eﬃcient algorithms for computing the least admissible solutions. We extend this scenario to validate the
fulﬁlment of safety and security constraints on admissible solutions; the modiﬁed development produces
a least solution together with a boolean value indicating whether or not the constraints are validated or
violated.
The main contribution is the development of a deterministic heuristics for obtaining a solution that is
close to the least solution while enforcing the safety or security constraints. We illustrate it on the Bell-
LaPadula mandatory access control policy where the heuristics is used to suggest modiﬁcations to the
security annotations of entities in order for the security policy to hold.
Keywords: Static Analysis, Flow Logic, Least Fixed Point logic, Security Properties, Bell-LaPadula
Mandatory Access Control.
1 Introduction
The goals of the paper are perhaps best explained by means of an analogy. In the
world of type systems one frequently distinguishes between soft typing and strong
typing. In soft typing all programs can be typed (possibly with an all encompassing
top type) and the goal is to use types to provide as much meaningful information
about subprograms as possible. In strong typing the whole point of the type system
is to reject certain programs as being ill-formed (including those that might lead to
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certain kinds of errors when executed) whereas providing meaningful information
about subprograms is an important secondary aim. Indeed, the slogan of strong
typing is that “well typed programs cannot go wrong” [9]. We might say that soft
typing focuses on solving a type inference problem whereas strong typing focuses
on enforcing the solvability of a type inference problem (which admittedly involves
a solving phase as well) subject to additional constraints.
In this paper we consider the world of static analysis as embodied in data ﬂow
and control ﬂow analysis. Here the view traditionally is that of solving an analysis
problem in order to provide information that may be useful, e.g. in case of a com-
piler generating better than naive code. When viewed in the general framework of
abstract interpretation [6,10] one usually establishes a Moore Family result showing
that a least solution always exists. Given a problem cls we shall write
S(cls) = ρ
for the least solution ρ. In Section 2 we slightly extend our approach [12,11] based
on formulae in stratiﬁed alternation-free least ﬁxed point logic.
Our ﬁrst contribution, in Section 3, is to extend the development so as to be
more directly applicable to software validation, e.g. for enforcing safety and security
policies. Quite frequently it is possible to formulate such policies as sets of safety
and security constraints upon the solution S(cls). Given a problem cls with such
additional constraints we shall write
V(cls) = (ρ, b)
for the least solution ρ, as computed by S(cls), together with a boolean value b
indicating the truth value of the constraints. While it is possible to obtain this eﬀect
already in the setting of Section 2, by means of observation predicates as discussed
towards the end of Section 3, the approach taken in Section 3 is to enlarge the
formalism with more explicit notation for the safety and security constraints. This
allows to write more readable speciﬁcations, that clearly seperate between which
constraints are to be interpreted in a soft versus strong manner. We illustrate the
development by showing how to enforce the condition, that programs in a functional
language never attempt to perform a function call unless the value applied is indeed
a function.
This paves the way for our main contribution, in Section 4, where we consider
how to deal with a problem cls that cannot be validated, i.e. a problem cls for which
V(cls) = (ρ, false). Here our goal is to develop a deterministic heuristics for ﬁnding
a small modiﬁcation  to the solution ρ such that the problem can be validated
under the assumption that the behaviour of  can be admitted. This idea has in
part been inspired by the non-standard approach to ﬁxpoints explored in [8] and
the iterative computation of solutions in [4]; it amounts to an iterative approach to
recalculating solutions, but unlike the rather ad-hoc presentation in [4], it allows to
state the desired solution within the logical framework. The desired result of our
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heuristics therefore is
H(cls) = (ρ, )
where  is the small modiﬁcation deemed necessary and ρ is the resulting least
solution for which the safety and security constraints can be enforced; we may write
this as V(cls@) = (ρ, true) where cls@ is a syntactic mechanism used to enforce
that ρ includes the contribution demanded by .
The main motivating example for this development is from the world of manda-
tory access control policies. We present an example showing how to formulate the
Bell-LaPadula mandatory access control policy [2,7] for enforcing conﬁdentiality. In
this policy, both programs (called subjects) and ﬁles (called objects) are given a se-
curity classiﬁcation: high (meaning secret) or low (meaning public); this may result
in classiﬁcations that actually violate the policy. We then use the development of
Section 4 to obtain an indication, in the form of , of which entities that need to be
reclassiﬁed in order to satisfy the policy and stay as close as possible to the original
intentions.
2 Flow Logic using ALFP
Flow Logic [12] is a speciﬁcation oriented approach to static analysis of programs.
For a program P of interest the focus is on specifying when an analysis estimate
A correctly describes the behaviour of P during evaluation. This takes the form of
a judgement
A P
that yields true whenever this is the case. Usually A is an element of a complete
lattice whose greatest element  satisﬁes the speciﬁcation; hence the focus at this
stage merely is to exclude analysis estimates that are observably incorrect and
there is no attempt to demand that the analysis estimate is the best or least choice
possible. The deﬁnition of A P often takes the form of recursive deﬁnitions (as
in Figures 1, 2 and 3 to be developed subsequently) and in general a co-inductive
deﬁnition interpretation is desired; when there is only limited use of higher-order
features (as in the examples in the present paper) the co-inductive interpretation
coincides with the more usual inductive interpretation.
The formal statement of correctness of the speciﬁcation is often expressed with
respect to an operational semantics of programs, P → P ′ and takes the form
A P ∧ P → P ′ ⇒ A P ′
for ensuring that the analysis estimate correctly describes all program derivations.
The proof is usually fairly straightforward by induction on the structure of P → P ′.
Having validated the correctness of the speciﬁcation the next concern is to ensure
that the speciﬁcation admits more usuable analysis estimates than . Following the
overall approach of Abstract Interpretation [6] this takes the form of showing that
the set of admissible solutions constitutes a Moore family:
Y ⊆ {A | A P} ⇒ Y ⊆ {A | A P}
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(This corresponds to what is sometimes called the model intersection property of
logics and is related to the existence of principal types in type systems [10].) It
follows that there exists a least solution
A0 = {A | A P}
and that it satisﬁes the speciﬁcation, i.e. A0 P .
Knowing that there exists a best analysis estimate our ﬁnal concern will be
how to compute it in a practical manner, e.g. in polynomial time in the size of the
program P . One approach is to generate a set of constraints or (as we shall do in
the present paper) a suitable logical formula for the program P . This is particularly
direct if the speciﬁcation of A P has already been performed using a suitable logic
and if the speciﬁcation coincides with its inductive interpretation. In this case it
is usually fairly straightforward to expand the deﬁning clauses of A P into an
equivalent logical formula cls.
Alternating Least Fixpoint Logic
We now review a suitable logic that has been used in a number of static analyses:
The Alternation-free fragment of Least Fixpoint Logic (ALFP) extends Horn clauses
by allowing both existential and universal quantiﬁcations in preconditions, negative
queries (subject to the notion of stratiﬁcation), disjunctions of preconditions, and
conjunctions of conclusions.
Deﬁnition 2.1 Given a ﬁxed countable set X of variables and a ﬁnite alphabet R
of predicate symbols we deﬁne the set of ALFP formulae (or clause sequences), cls,
together with clauses, cl, and preconditions, pre, by the grammar
pre ::= R (x1, · · · , xn) | ¬R (x1, · · · , xn)
| pre1 ∧ pre2 | pre1 ∨ pre2 | ∃x : pre | ∀x : pre
cl ::= R (x1, · · · , xn) | 1 | cl1 ∧ cl2 | ∀x : cl | pre ⇒ cl
cls ::= cl1, · · · , clk
where x ∈ X , R ∈ R and k is at least 1.
Occurrences of R and ¬R in preconditions are called queries and negative queries,
respectively, whereas the other occurrences of R are called assertions of the predi-
cate R. We write 1 for the always true clause.
Stratiﬁcation. In order to ensure desirable theoretical and pragmatic properties
in the presence of negation, we introduce a notion of stratiﬁcation similar to the
one in Datalog [5,1]. Intuitively, stratiﬁcation ensures that a negative query is not
performed until the predicate queried has been fully asserted. This is important for
ensuring that once a precondition evaluates to true it will continue doing so even
after further assertions of predicates.
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Deﬁnition 2.2 A formula cls is stratiﬁed w.r.t. rank whenever it has the form
cls = cl1, · · · , clk, and the function rank : R → {0, · · · , k} satisﬁes the following
properties for all i = 1, · · · , k:
(i) rank (R) ≥ i for every assertion R in cli;
(ii) rank (R) ≤ i for every positive query R in cli; and
(iii) rank (R) < i for every negative query ¬R in cli.
A formula cls is stratiﬁed if there exists a ranking function rank such that cls is
stratiﬁed w.r.t. rank .
Not all formulae are stratiﬁed and a formula may be stratiﬁed w.r.t. some ranking
functions but not stratiﬁed w.r.t other ranking functions. Given a formula cls =
cl1, · · · , clk one can construct an optimal ranking function rank, i.e. one that makes
cls stratiﬁed w.r.t. rank if and only if cls is stratiﬁed, by setting rank(R) = k if there
are no (positive or negative) queries to R in cls, otherwise setting rank(R) = 0 if
there are no assertions to R in cls, and setting rank(R) = i if cli is the rightmost
clause containing an assertion to R.
Stratiﬁability. Sometimes a clause does not have the form of a formula that is
stratiﬁed w.r.t. some ranking function rank although it can easily be rearranged into
such a formula. This is possible if for each subclause · · ·R · · · ⇒ · · ·S · · · we have
that rank (R) ≤ rank(S) and furthermore, if for each subclause · · · ¬R · · · ⇒ · · ·S · · ·
we have that rank (R) < rank (S). We shall say that a clause cl is stratiﬁable
w.r.t rank whenever these conditions are met. One approach to obtaining a stratiﬁed
formula cls from the clause cl is simply to construct it as cls = cl1, · · · , clk where
each cli is obtained from cl by replacing assertions of rank diﬀerent from i with the
clause 1.
In a similar vein a clause cl is stratiﬁable if it is possible to construct a ranking
function rank such that the clause is stratiﬁable w.r.t. rank . An easy test for this
condition is to build a graph with predicate symbols as nodes (called R and S below)
and two kinds of edges; there is a normal edge from R to S if the clause contains
a subclause · · ·R · · · ⇒ · · ·S · · · and there is a fat edge from R to S if the clause
contains a subclause · · · ¬R · · · ⇒ · · ·S · · · . Then the clause is stratiﬁable if and
only if there is no loop containing a fat edge.
Stratiﬁable clauses are accepted by a preprocessor to the Succinct Solver [11]
and are turned into appropriately stratiﬁed formulae which are then solved.
Constraint Satisfaction
We take a pure approach where the logic is interpreted over a universe U of con-
stants. Given interpretations ρ and σ for predicate symbols and variables, respec-
tively, we deﬁne in Table 1 the following satisfaction relations:
(ρ, σ) |= pre for preconditions pre,
(ρ, σ) |= cl for clauses cl, and
(ρ, σ) |= cls for formulas cls.
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(ρ, σ) |= R (x1, · · · , xn) iﬀ (σ(x1), · · · , σ(xn)) ∈ ρ(R)
(ρ, σ) |= ¬R (x1, · · · , xn) iﬀ (σ(x1), · · · , σ(xn)) ∈ ρ(R)
(ρ, σ) |= pre1 ∧ pre2 iﬀ (ρ, σ) |= pre1 and (ρ, σ) |= pre2
(ρ, σ) |= pre1 ∨ pre2 iﬀ (ρ, σ) |= pre1 or (ρ, σ) |= pre2
(ρ, σ) |= ∃x : pre iﬀ (ρ, σ[x → a]) |= pre for some a ∈ U
(ρ, σ) |= ∀x : pre iﬀ (ρ, σ[x → a]) |= pre for all a ∈ U
(ρ, σ) |= R (x1, · · · , xn) iﬀ (σ(x1), · · · , σ(xn)) ∈ ρ(R)
(ρ, σ) |= 1 iﬀ true
(ρ, σ) |= cl1 ∧ cl2 iﬀ (ρ, σ) |= cl1 and (ρ, σ) |= cl2
(ρ, σ) |= ∀x : cl iﬀ (ρ, σ[x → a]) |= cl for all a ∈ U
(ρ, σ) |= pre ⇒ cl iﬀ (ρ, σ) |= cl whenever (ρ, σ) |= pre
(ρ, σ) |= cl1, · · · , clk iﬀ (ρ, σ) |= cl1 and · · · and (ρ, σ) |= clk
Table 1
Semantics of preconditions, clauses and formulae.
In particular, we write ρ(R) for the set of n-tuples (a1, · · · , an) from U
n associated
with the n-ary predicate R and σ(x) for the element of U denoted by the variable
x.
We shall mainly be interested in closed formulae cls, i.e. clause sequences that
have no free variables. Hence the choice of the interpretation σ is immaterial, so
we can ﬁx an arbitrary interpretation σ0. We then call an interpretation ρ of the
predicate symbols, a solution to the formula cls provided (ρ, σ0) |= cls.
Let Δ be the set of interpretations ρ of predicate symbols in R over U and let
rank be a ﬁxed ranking function.
Deﬁnition 2.3 The lexicographical ordering  is deﬁned by ρ1  ρ2 if and only if
there is some j ∈ {0, · · · , k} such that the following properties hold:
• ρ1(R) = ρ2(R) for all R ∈ R with rank (R) < j
• ρ1(R) ⊆ ρ2(R) for all R ∈ R with rank (R) = j
• either j is maximal in rank or ρ1(R) ⊂ ρ2(R) for at least one R ∈ R with
rank (R) = j
The subset-ordering ⊆ is given by ρ1 ⊆ ρ2 whenever ∀R ∈ R : ρ1(R) ⊆ ρ2(R).
Fact 2.4 If ρ1 ⊆ ρ2 then ρ1  ρ2 (but not necessarily vice versa).
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Proof. We ﬁrst assume that ρ1 ⊆ ρ2 and prove that ρ1  ρ2. For this let j
′ ∈
{−1, · · · , k} be maximal such that rank (R) ≤ j′ =⇒ ρ1(R) = ρ2(R) and let j be
the smaller of j′ + 1 and k; then it is immediate to show that ρ1  ρ2 using that
ρ1 ⊆ ρ2.
To show that the converse result does not need to hold it suﬃces to exhibit ρ1
and ρ2 such that ρ1  ρ2 but ρ1 ⊆ ρ2. For this we consider predicates R1 and R2
with rank (Ri) = i and deﬁne ρ1(R1) = ρ2(R2) = ∅ and ρ1(R2) = ρ2(R1) = {·}. We
then have ρ1  ρ2 (as may be seen by taking take j = 1) but ρ1 ⊆ ρ2. 
Proposition 2.5 (from [11]) The set Δ = (Δ, ) forms a complete lattice.
The solution set Δcls = {ρ ∈ Δ | (ρ, σ0) |= cls} forms a Moore family, i.e. it is
closed under greatest lower bounds (w.r.t. ), whenever cls is a closed and stratiﬁed
formula.
The Succinct Solver
In the sequel we shall be interested only in the least solution ρ as guaranteed by
the above proposition; formally it is given by
S(cls) = {ρ ∈ Δ | (ρ, σ0) |= cls}
and is the solution computed by the Succinct Solver [11].
For the purposes of this paper we need the basic idea behind the inductive
construction of the solution speciﬁed above. It suﬃces with the following imprecise
account of the operation of the Succinct Solver; referring to [11] for the details
of the considerably more intelligent operation of the algorithm. Given a stratiﬁed
clause cls we may construct two functionals Ncls and Fcls. For this we shall write
ρ = ρ1∪· · ·∪ρk where each ρi deﬁnes the predicates of rank i (where we assume for
simplicity of presentation that all predicates have non-zero rank). We set Ncls(ρ1∪
· · · ∪ ρk) = (1 ∪ · · · ∪ k) whenever 1 ∪ · · · ∪ k constitutes the new contribution
to the predicates arising from one pass through cls. Then we set
Fcls(ρ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
ρ if Ncls(ρ) = (⊥, · · · ,⊥)
ρ ∪ i if Ncls(ρ) = (⊥, · · · , i, · · · ) and i = ⊥
where the intention is that i indicates the ﬁrst component of Ncls(ρ) that is not ⊥.
The Succinct Solver may then be described as operating until stabilisation of Fcls,
i.e. S(cls) = unionsqiF
i
cls
(⊥, · · · ,⊥).
For a partial order ≤ (e.g.  or ⊆) we shall say that the functional F is ≤-
monotonic if ∀ρ1, ρ2 : ρ1 ≤ ρ2 =⇒ F (ρ1) ≤ F (ρ2) and ≤-extensive if ∀ρ : ρ ≤ F (ρ).
We then have:
Fact 2.6 The functional Fcls is ⊆-extensive and -extensive. (The functional need
not be ⊆-monotonic nor -monotonic.)
Proof. That Fcls is ⊆-extensive, i.e. ρ ⊆ Fcls(ρ), is obvious by construction: we
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have both ρ ⊆ ρ and ρ ⊆ ρ ∪ i. That Fcls is -extensive, i.e. ρ  Fcls(ρ), then
follows using Fact 2.4.
That Fcls need not be -monotonic can be shown by considering the scenario
in the proof of Fact 2.4. Consider two predicates R1 and R2 with rank (Ri) = i
and take cls = R1(·). Next deﬁne ρ1 by ρ1(R1) = ∅, ρ1(R2) = {·}, deﬁne ρ2 by
ρ2(R1) = {·}, ρ2(R2) = ∅, and deﬁne ρ3 by ρ3(R1) = {·}, ρ3(R2) = {·}. We then
have Fcls(ρ1) = ρ3 and Fcls(ρ2) = ρ2 and ρ1  ρ2 but ρ3  ρ2. This shows that
ρ1  ρ2 need not imply that Fcls(ρ1)  Fcls(ρ2).
That Fcls need not be ⊆-monotonic can be shown in a similar way by taking
cls = ¬R1(·) ⇒ R2(·) and deﬁning ρi(Rj) = ∅ except ρ2(R1) = ρ3(R2) = {·}. We
then have Fcls(ρ1) = ρ3 and Fcls(ρ2) = ρ2 and ρ1 ⊆ ρ2 but ρ3 ⊆ ρ2. This shows
that ρ1 ⊆ ρ2 need not imply that Fcls(ρ1) ⊆ Fcls(ρ2). 
3 Safety and Security Constraints on ALFP
As a motivating example consider a simple functional language
el ::= ttl | ﬀ l | xl | (λx.el00 )
l | (el11 e
l2
2 )
l | (if el00 then e
l1
1 else e
l2
2 )
l
where el ranges over labelled expressions. A control ﬂow analysis keeps track of
which values (truth values and lambda abstractions) reach which points in the pro-
gram. Labels need not be unique (and indeed are unlikely to be so after reduction),
so we shall take care to ensure that the speciﬁcation of the control ﬂow analysis
does not make that assumption. We axiomatise the analysis using these predicates:
C(l, v) indicates that the set of values arising at some subexpression la-
belled l may contain the value v,
R(x, v) indicates that in the environment the variable x may be bound to
the value v,
P(l, v) indicates that the value v may be an actual parameter to some
λ-abstraction whose body is labelled l,
B(v) indicates that v is a boolean value used in the program,
A(l) indicates that l labels the body of some λ-abstraction mentioned
in the program.
For a given program el we then generate clauses
(A,B,C, P,R) el
as shown in Figure 1. Here the variables (like u, v and w) range over the universe U
that consists of the basic values tt and ﬀ and all labels. In the clause for an appli-
cation (el11 e
l2
2 )
l, a typical value of u will be some label l0 denoting a λ-abstraction.
The overall clause generated for the entire program is the conjunction of all the
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(A,B,C, P,R) ttl iﬀ C(l, tt) ∧ B(tt)
(A,B,C, P,R) ﬀl iﬀ C(l,ﬀ) ∧ B(ﬀ)
(A,B,C, P,R) xl iﬀ ∀v : R(x, v) ⇒ C(l, v)
(A,B,C, P,R) (λx.el00 )
l
iﬀ (A,B,C, P,R) el00 ∧
C(l, l0) ∧ A(l0) ∧
∀v : P(l0, v) ⇒ R(x, v)
(A,B,C, P,R) (el11 e
l2
2 )
l
iﬀ (A,B,C, P,R) el11 ∧
(A,B,C, P,R) el22 ∧
∀u : C(l1, u) ⇒ (
(∀v : C(l2, v) ⇒ P(u, v)) ∧
(∀w : C(u,w) ⇒ C(l, w)))
(A,B,C, P,R) (if el00 then e
l1
1 else e
l2
2 )
l
iﬀ (A,B,C, P,R) el00 ∧
(A,B,C, P,R) el11 ∧
(A,B,C, P,R) el22 ∧
∀v : (C(l1, v) ∨ C(l2, v)) ⇒ C(l, v)
Fig. 1. Flow logic for a functional language — without safety constraints.
clauses above. It is clearly a stratiﬁable clause w.r.t. a rank function given by
rank (B ) = rank (A ) = 1 and rank (C ) = rank (R ) = rank (P ) = 2.
Example 3.1 In order to validate the correct behaviour of the program it would be
prudent to impose constraints ensuring that only functions are applied to arguments
and that only booleans are used to discriminate between branches of conditionals.
Such constraints can be checked by evaluating the following formulae on the least
solution to the clause generated above:
for an application (el11 e
l2
2 )
l check that ∀u : C(l1, u) ⇒ A(u), and
for a conditional (if el00 then e
l1
1 else e
l2
2 )
l check that ∀u : C(l0, u) ⇒ B(u).
It would be preferable if the constraints could be integrated with the speciﬁcation
of the clause generation.
However, we cannot merely add the above formulae verbatim to the speciﬁcation
in Figure 1, because rather than giving rise to strong constraints that may evaluate
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to false, they would give rise to soft constraints that merely add new “spurious
elements” to the predicates A and B. Indeed, the incorrect program (ttl1el22 ) would
merely add A(tt) to the predicate A, rather than report a violation. Similarly,
the incorrect program (if (λx.el)l0 then el11 else e
l2
2 ) would merely add B(l) to the
predicate B, rather than report a violation.
It is worth pointing out, that the least solution as produced by S, given Figure 1
as it stands, ensures that no such “spurious elements” are part of the least solution
(simply because they are not explicitly demanded to be so by the clause constructed
above). 
Constrained ALFP
We therefore extend the syntax of ALFP by allowing explicit occurrences of con-
straints. We distinguish between an assertion R(x1, · · · , xn) and a constraint by
writing the latter as R!(x1, · · · , xn).
Deﬁnition 3.2 The set of constrained ALFP clauses, cl, are given by
cl ::= R!(x1, · · · , xn) | R (x1, · · · , xn) | 1 | cl1 ∧ cl2 | ∀x : cl | pre ⇒ cl
whereas constrained preconditions and formulae are as in Deﬁnition 2.1.
A constrained formula cls is stratiﬁed w.r.t. rank whenever it has the form
cls = cl1, · · · , clk, and the function rank : R → {0, · · · , k} satisﬁes the following
properties for all i = 1, · · · , k:
(i) rank (R) < i for every constraint R! in cli;
(ii) rank (R) ≥ i for every assertion R in cli;
(iii) rank (R) ≤ i for every positive query R in cli; and
(iv) rank (R) < i for every negative predicate ¬R in cli.
A constrained formula cls is stratiﬁed if there exists a ranking function rank such
that cls is stratiﬁed w.r.t. rank .
In the deﬁnition of stratiﬁed we have taken the view (to become even clearer
when discussing constraint violations below) that a predicate must not be used as
a constraint until it has been fully asserted.
The optimal ranking function is constructed much as before: rank(R) = k if there
are no (positive or negative) queries to R nor constraints on R in cls, otherwise
rank(R) = 0 if there are no assertions to R in cl, and rank(R) = i if cli is the
rightmost clause containing an assertion to R.
The considerations of stratiﬁability apply mutatis mutandis; as before there is
a normal edge from R to S if the clause contains a subclause · · ·R · · · ⇒ · · ·S · · ·
and there is a fat edge from R to S if the clause contains a subclause · · · ¬R · · · ⇒
· · ·S · · · . (In both cases S denotes an assertion rather than a constraint.) Much as
before a constrained clause cl is stratiﬁable if and only if there is no loop containing
a fat edge. However, when constructing the stratiﬁed formula cls we may have to
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ignore enforce
R!(x) 1 R (x)
R (x) R (x) R (x)
1 1 1
cl1 ∧ cl2 ignore(cl1) ∧ ignore(cl2) enforce(cl1) ∧ enforce(cl2)
∀x : cl ∀x : ignore(cl) ∀x : enforce(cl)
pre ⇒ cl pre ⇒ ignore(cl) pre ⇒ enforce(cl)
cl1, · · · , clk ignore(cl1), · · · , ignore(clk) enforce(cl1), · · · ,enforce(clk)
Table 2
Ignoring and enforcing the constraints in clauses and formulae.
introduce a new rank k+1 and construct it as cls = cl1, · · · , clk+1 where each cli is
obtained from cl by replacing assertions of rank diﬀerent from i with the clause 1
and furthermore replacing constraints of rank diﬀerent from i−1 with the clause 1.
As an example, the clause R(a) ⇒ (R(b)∧R!(c)) becomes R(a) ⇒ (R(b)∧1), R(a) ⇒
(1 ∧R!(c)).
Constraint Validation
We shall deal with the semantics of constrained ALFP in a syntactic manner, by
deﬁning two ways in which to translate a constrained formula into a formula of
ALFP.
The function ignore simply replaces · · ·R!(x¯) · · · by · · · 1 · · · and hence ignores
the constraints imposed (see Table 2 for the details):
ignore(· · ·R!(x) · · · ) = · · ·1 · · ·
It is useful for extracting the constraint-free part of the formula for which the
least solution is desired. If cls is a stratiﬁed and constrained formula then clearly
ignore(cls) is a stratiﬁed formula of ALFP.
Similarly, the function enforce replaces · · ·R!(x¯) · · · by · · ·R(x¯) · · · and hence
ignores the distinction between constraints and assertions (see Table 2 for the de-
tails):
enforce(· · ·R!(x) · · · ) = · · ·R(x) · · ·
It is useful for extracting a formula that can be used to check whether or not the
constraints are fulﬁlled. However, even if cls is a stratiﬁed and constrained formula,
the formula enforce(cls) need not be a stratiﬁed formula of ALFP; as an example
consider 1,¬R(a) ⇒ R!(b) where R has rank 1.
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(A,B,C, P,R) ttl iﬀ C(l, tt) ∧ B(tt)
(A,B,C, P,R) ﬀl iﬀ C(l,ﬀ) ∧ B(ﬀ)
(A,B,C, P,R) xl iﬀ ∀v : R(x, v) ⇒ C(l, v)
(A,B,C, P,R) (λx.el00 )
l
iﬀ (A,B,C, P,R) el00 ∧
C(l, l0) ∧ A(l0) ∧
∀v : P(l0, v) ⇒ R(x, v)
(A,B,C, P,R) (el11 e
l2
2 )
l
iﬀ (A,B,C, P,R) el11 ∧
(A,B,C, P,R) el22 ∧
∀u : C(l1, u) ⇒ (A !(u) ∧
(∀v : C(l2, v) ⇒ P(u, v)) ∧
(∀w : C(u,w) ⇒ C(l, w)))
(A,B,C, P,R) (if el00 then e
l1
1 else e
l2
2 )
l
iﬀ (A,B,C, P,R) el00 ∧
(A,B,C, P,R) el11 ∧
(A,B,C, P,R) el22 ∧
∀u : C(l0, u) ⇒ B !(u) ∧
∀v : (C(l1, v) ∨ C(l2, v)) ⇒ C(l, v)
Fig. 2. Flow logic for a functional language — with safety constraints.
Given a closed, stratiﬁed and constrained formula cls, we may deﬁne the valida-
tion function V(cls) = (ρ, b) as follows:
V(cls) = (ρ, b) where
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ρ = S(ignore(cls))
b =
⎧⎨
⎩
true if(ρ, σ0) |= enforce(cls)
false otherwise
Here V(cls) = (ρ, b) means that ρ is the least solution when ignoring the constraints
and b indicates whether or not the constraints are validated.
Example 3.3 Returning to Figure 1 and Example 3.1 we can now write the clauses
to be generated for application and conditionals as in Figure 2: In the case of
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observe
R!(x) ¬R (x) ⇒ RE (x)
R (x) R (x)
1 1
cl1 ∧ cl2 observe(cl1) ∧ observe(cl2)
∀x : cl ∀x : observe(cl)
pre⇒ cl pre ⇒ observe(cl)
cl1, · · · , clk observe(cl1), · · · ,observe(clk)
Table 3
Observing the constraints in clauses and formulae.
(el11 e
l2
2 )
l this amounts to adding the safety constraint ∀u : C(l1, u) ⇒ A !(u) and
in the case of if el00 then e
l1
1 else e
l2
2 )
l this amounts to adding the safety constraint
∀u : C(l0, u) ⇒ B !(u).
The resulting clauses are stratiﬁable w.r.t. the rank function used before. Fur-
thermore, ignore translates the clauses generated into clauses that are logically
equivalent to the ones of Figure 1, whereas enforce translates the clauses gen-
erated into clauses that are logically equivalent to the conjunction of the ones of
Figure 1 together with the constraints imposed in Example 3.1.
Considering once again the incorrect program (ttl1el22 ), we now do report a vio-
lation as A!(tt) fails. Similarly, the incorrect program (if (λx.el)l0 then el11 else e
l2
2 )
also gives rise to a violation as B!(l) fails. 
Constraint Violation
There is an alternative approach to calculating V(cls) = (ρ, b) that does not require
an extension of the logic with constraints of the form R!(x1, · · · , xn) (as opposed
to assertions of the form R!(x1, · · · , xn)). We sketch it here, because it has been
used in the literature [3] and because it could be used as an alternative implemen-
tation strategy; however, the resulting speciﬁcations less intuitive than what has
been suggested here. The alternative approach makes use of auxiliary predicates,
i.e., observation predicates of the form RE(x1, · · · , xn), for directly recording the
violations. The intention then is that RE holds on those elements where R! would
have failed.
To describe the alternative approach in the current setting, we deﬁne a function
observe that translates · · ·R!(x¯) · · · to · · · (¬R(x¯)⇒ RE(x¯)) · · · where we assume
that to each “ordinary” predicate R there potentially is an “observation” predicate
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RE (see Table 3 for the details):
observe(· · ·R!(x) · · · ) = · · · ¬R(x) ⇒ RE(x) · · ·
We shall writeR◦ for the set of ordinary predicates andRE for the set of observation
predicates and assume that R is the disjoint union of these two sets. Furthermore,
we extend the given ranking function rank by setting rank (RE) = k + 1 for all
observation predicates RE (regardless of the rank of R).
We can now prove the formal equivalence of the two approaches. We do so
by showing that V can be precisely characterised in terms of the emptiness of the
observation predicates:
Proposition 3.4 Writing · · · |R◦ for the restriction to ordinary predicates only we
have:
V(cls) = (ρ, b) where
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
ρ = S(observe(cls)) |R◦
b =
∧
RE∈RE (ρ(R
E) = ∅)
Proof. Straightforward by the above reasoning. 
4 Heuristics for Enforcing Constraints
As a fairly substantial motivating example consider a simpliﬁed presentation of the
Bell-LaPadula mandatory access control policy for enforcing conﬁdentiality [2,7].
The basic entities are subjects (e.g. programs or users), objects (e.g. ﬁles), opera-
tions (read and write) and security levels (high and low).
The actual operations are speciﬁed by statements of the form read(s, o) for
indicating that the subject s is initiating a read-operation on the object o and
similarly write(s, o) for indicating that the subject s is initiating a write-operation
on the object o. We do not formalise the semantics of this language which should
be seen as expressing the access requests that need to be mediated by an operating
system.
The discretionary part of the access control policy is syntactically speciﬁed by
statements of the form readable(o : s1, · · · , sn) for indicating that the object o may
be read by any one of the subjects s1, · · · , sn and by writable(o : s1, · · · , sn) for
indicating that the object o may be written by any one of the subjects s1, · · · , sn.
The mandatory part of the access control policy is syntactically speciﬁed by
statements of the form subject(s : φ) for indicating that the subject s is allowed to
operate at security level φ (being one of H or L) and by object(o : φ) for indicating
that the object o may be accessed at security level φ (being one of H or L).
For the purposes of specifying the security policy we shall view the semantics as
operating over conﬁgurations of the form (S,O,M,B). Here S(s, φ) records that the
subject s has been previously allowed to operate at security level φ; in the classical
presentation [7] it aims at capturing fC(s) = fS(s) = φ. Similarly, O(s, φ) records
that the object o has been previously allowed to be manipulated at security level
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φ; in the classical presentation [7] it aims at capturing fO(o) = φ. Furthermore,
M(s, o, r) captures that the object o has previously been recorded as readable by
subject s, and M(s, o, w) captures that the object o has previously been recorded as
writable by subject s; this is as in the classical presentation [7]. Finally, B(s, o, r)
indicates that in the current state the subject s has initiated reading the object o,
and B(s, o, w) indicates that in the current state the subject s has initiated writing
the object o; also this is as in [7].
We shall develop a simple ﬂow-insensitive analysis for keeping track of these
operations and for enforcing the Bell-LaPadula mandatory access control policy
(called mac). Since the analysis is ﬂow-insensitive it may operate over an “abstract
state” (S,O,M,B) as explained above. The clauses can then be generated as shown
in Figure 3.
The clauses for reading and writing make use of the policy mac also deﬁned in
Figure 3. The ﬁrst line of mac considers a situation where a subject s is simultane-
ously writing an object o and reading an object o′. The second line enforces that
these operations have indeed been previously allowed as indicated by the access
control matrix M . The remaining lines enforce that the security classiﬁcation of o
dominates those of s, o′ and that the security classiﬁcation of o′ is dominated by
those of s, o (relying once more on fC = fS in the classical presentation of [7]).
The clause generated is clearly stratiﬁable. A simple choice of a ranking function
is to take rank (S) = 1, rank (O) = 1, rank(M) = 1 and rank (B) = 1. A more
interesting choice (as we shall argue shortly) is to take rank (S) = 1, rank (O) = 2,
rank (M) = 3 and rank (B) = 4.
Example 4.1 To be a bit more concrete consider a program involving one subject
sub and two objects ob1 and ob2:
/* declarations */
subject(sub:H);
object(ob1:L); readable(ob1:sub); writable(ob1:sub);
object(ob2:L); readable(ob2:sub); writable(ob2:sub);
/* access operations */
read(sub,ob2); write(sub,ob1);
Here there is a violation of the mandatory part of the access control policy: when sub
reads ob2 and writes ob1 the security level of sub (which is H) must be dominated
by that of ob1 (which is L).
Assuming that the program is intended to be legitimate we must modify the
security annotations such that mac holds. Intutively, there are two ways to do so:
one is to downgrade sub to L, the other is to upgrade ob1 to H. From a security policy
point of view it is usually preferred to upgrade the objects rather than downgrading
the subjects (see [7] for a discussion). In the present case this means that we prefer
to add “spurious elements” to relations like O rather than relations like S.
Hence we would like a general heuristists that, based on the rank-information
automatically suggests remedial actions. We shall decide to go for an approach
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(S,O,M,B) read(s, o) iﬀ B(s, o, r) ∧mac
(S,O,M,B) write(s, o) iﬀ B(s, o, w) ∧mac
(S,O,M,B) readable(o : s1, · · · , sn) iﬀ M(o, s1, r) ∧ · · · ∧M(o, sn, r)
(S,O,M,B) writable(o : s1, · · · , sn) iﬀ M(o, s1, w) ∧ · · · ∧M(o, sn, w)
(S,O,M,B) subject(s : φ) iﬀ S(s, φ)
(S,O,M,B) object(o : φ) iﬀ O(o, φ)
(S,O,M,B) S1;S2 iﬀ (S,O,M,B) S1 ∧ (S,O,M,B) S2
mac =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∀s, o, o′ : B(s, o, w) ∧B(s, o′, r)
⇒ M !(s, o, w) ∧M !(s, o′, r) ∧
(S(s, H) ∧ ¬S(s, L))⇒ O!(o, H) ∧
(O(o, L) ∧ ¬O(o, H)) ⇒ (S!(s, L) ∧O!(o′, L)) ∧
(O(o′, H) ∧ ¬O(o′, L)) ⇒ (O!(o, H) ∧ S!(s, H)) ∧
(S(s, L) ∧ ¬S(s, H))⇒ O!(o′, L)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Fig. 3. Flow logic for mandatory access control — with security constraints.
where we prefer to remedy the values of higher-rank relations rather than lower-rank
relations; in operational terms this means restricting how far the Succinct Solver
needs to backtrack and corresponds to its overall mode of operation as described
in Section 2. In the present case this suggests taking rank (S) = 1, rank (O) = 2,
rank (M) = 3 and rank (B) = 4. 
Acceptable Heuristics
So far we have been content with an optimal algorithm S for solving an analysis
problem expressed by a closed and stratiﬁed formula, and an optimal algorithm V
for solving and validating the constraints as expressed by a closed and stratiﬁed
constrained formula.
Turning to the construction of a heuristic algorithm H we shall shortly formulate
a notion of optimality and show that in general there does not exist an optimal
algorithm. Hence we shall consider candidate functionsH of the formH(cls) = (ρ, )
and deﬁne when we consider them to be acceptable. Henceforth, we shall write
cls ∈ F [rank ] to express that cls is a closed constrained formula that is stratiﬁed
w.r.t. rank .
The ﬁrst part of the development amounts to allowing  to be freely chosen but
to demand that ρ is constructed in an optimal manner from cls and  and to show
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that this is always possible.
Deﬁnition 4.2 A function of the form H(cls) = (ρ, ) is a heuristics provided that
ρ is least such that ρ ⊇  and (ρ, σ0) |= ignore(cls) whenever cls ∈ F [rank ].
Proposition 4.3 If cls ∈ F [rank ] and  is given, then there always exists a least ρ
such that ρ ⊇  and (ρ, σ0) |= ignore(cls).
Proof. The proof amounts to showing that
ρ = {ρ′ ∈ Δ | (ρ′, σ0) |= ignore(cls) ∧ ρ
′ ⊇ }
always exists and fulﬁls the demands. Many strategies of proof can be used, but
for the purposes of this presentation we restrict ourselves to the case ∀R ∈ R :
rank (R) > 0 where we can give a simple “syntactic” proof. Given cls = cl1, · · · , clk
we deﬁne the formula cls@ = cl ′1, · · · , cl
′
k by setting
cl ′i = cli ∧
∧
a∈(R),rank (R)=i
R(a)
Clearly (ρ, σ0) |= ignore(cls)@ is equivalent to (ρ, σ0) |= ignore(cls) ∧ ρ ⊇  and
hence the above formula for ρ amounts to ρ = S(ignore(cls)@). 
The second part of the development amounts to ensuring that  contains all the
“spurious elements” that need to be admitted in order to fulﬁl the constraints.
Deﬁnition 4.4 A heuristics in the sense of Deﬁnition 4.2 of the formH(cls) = (ρ, )
is acceptable provided that (ρ, σ0) |= enforce(cls) whenever cls ∈ F [rank ].
Fact 4.5 An acceptable heuristics exists.
Proof. Take H(cls) = (,). 
To be able to choose between acceptable heuristics we shall deﬁne a partial order
for comparing them. We base it on the lexicographic order (rather than the subset-
order) in order to capture the intentions expressed towards the end of Example 4.1.
Deﬁnition 4.6 A heuristics H1 is better than a heuristics H2, and equivalently H2
is worse than H1, provided that for all cls ∈ F [rank ]: if H1(cls) = (ρ1, 1) and
H2(cls) = (ρ2, 2) then 1  2.
We prefer this deﬁnition to the alternative where we instead compare the result-
ing solutions, as in ρ1  ρ2, because of its focus on the “spurious elements” that
need to be added. Clearly the heuristics indicated in the proof of Fact 4.5 is worse
than all others.
It would be natural to try to ﬁnd the best acceptable heuristics. Unfortunately,
this is not possible, i.e. we do not have the analogue of a Moore Family result for
acceptable heuristics.
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Proposition 4.7 There exists no best acceptable heuristics.
Proof. It suﬃces to ﬁnd a stratiﬁed constrained formula cls for which no acceptable
heuristics H can give a best result. For this consider the formula
1, ((¬R(a) ∧ ¬R(b)) ⇒ R!(a)) ∧ ((¬R(a) ∧ ¬R(b))⇒ R!(b))
where rank (R) = 1 and the universe is U = {a, b}. A heuristics H must produce
one of the following pairs (ρi, i):
(i) 1(R) = ∅ and ρ1(R) = ∅;
(ii) 2(R) = {a} and ρ2(R) = {a};
(iii) 3(R) = {b} and ρ3(R) = {b};
(iv) 4(R) = {a, b} and ρ4(R) = {a, b}.
Of these 2–4 are acceptable and 2–3 are acceptable and minimal. Since there are
two incompatible minimal choices no optimal choice of an acceptable heuristics can
exist. 
The implication of this result is that there may be two distinct heuristics that
are both minimal (and hence neither is better than the other). In the setting of
Example 4.1, this suggests that there may be incomparable ways of making an
“insecure” system “secure”, neither of which is better than the other.
A Good Acceptable Heuristics
In order to get a handle of the “arbitrary choices” that Proposition 4.7 opens up
for, we shall consider a class of parameterised iterative heuristic algorithms of the
form H[choose, take]. Here choose is a function intended to select an index from a
set of indices, and take is a function intended to select part of a partial solution;
it will turn out that our preferred candidate has choose = max and take = λ.
(i.e. the identity).
The deﬁnition is given in Table 4. It accepts as input a closed, constrained and
stratiﬁed formula cls w.r.t. a ranking function rank (that without loss of generality
is assumed to use non-zero ranks only) and produces the pair (ρ, ). It operates in
an iterative manner, “backpropagating” any violations to constraints. We use the
function observe(· · ·R!(x) · · · ) = · · · ¬R(x) ⇒ RE(x) · · · of Table 3 and we write
R◦i for the set of ordinary predicates of rank i and similarly R
E
j for the set of error
predicates corresponding to ordinary predicates of rank j and ﬁnally we use · · · |R′
to denote the restriction to a set R′ of predicates.
We shall brieﬂy consider three algorithms. One is H[max , λ.] that selects
the maximum index for which a violation of the constraints have been observed
and then selects the entire error-component corresponding to this index. Another is
H[min, λ.] that selects the minimum index for which a violation of the constraints
have been observed and then selects the entire error-component corresponding to
this index.
F. Nielson, H. Riis Nielson / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 172 (2007) 523–543540
A potential third algorithm is H[ﬁrst ,ﬁrst ] that somewhat informally chooses
the ﬁrst index and tuple for which an error is observed. While the ﬁrst two algo-
rithms have been precisely deﬁned and are evaluation-order independent, the third
algorithm is somewhat informally deﬁned and is clearly evaluation-order dependent
(in terms of the operation of the Succinct Solver [11] as surveyed in Section 2).
The correct operation of the algorithm is guaranteed by:
Proposition 4.8 H[choose, take] is an acceptable heuristics if ∀I : choose(I) ∈ I
and ∀ρ˜i : ρ˜i = ⊥ ⇒ take(ρ˜i) = ⊥.
Proof. The assumptions suﬃce for proving that H[choose, take] always terminates
because in each iteration of the loop the tuple ((1, · · · , i,⊥, · · · ,⊥), i) will be
strictly increasing w.r.t. the lexicographic order deﬁned using  for the ﬁrst com-
ponent (i.e., (1, · · · , i,⊥, · · · ,⊥)) and ≤ for the second component (i.e., i). 
This shows that all three algorithms are acceptable heuristics. As our preferred
choice we discount H[ﬁrst ,ﬁrst ] because it is evaluation-order dependent and hence
hard to characterise; indeed it may appear non-deterministic in case of even simple
logically equivalent formula rearrangements.
Finally we prefer H[max , λ.] over H[min, λ.] as it turns out to be the pre-
ferred candidate in our motivating example (see Example 4.9 below). However, there
are examples (see Example 4.10 below) where diﬀerent preferences are in order.
Example 4.9 Returning to Example 4.1, H[max , λ.] suggests the remedial ac-
tion of upgrading ob1 to H by producing (O) = {(ob1, H)}. This is preferable to
H[min, λ.] that suggests the remedial action of downgrading sub to L by produc-
ing (S) = {(sub, L)}. 
Example 4.10 For an example of a formula where H[min, λ.] performs prefer-
ably to H[max , λ.] consider
R(a), S(a), T (a), (¬S(b) ∧ ¬T (b)) ⇒ (S!(b) ∧ T !(b)), T (b)⇒ R!(b)
where rank (R) = 1, rank(S) = 2 and rank (T ) = 3. Here H[min , λ.] produces
(R) = ∅, (S) = {b}, (T ) = ∅ and ρ(R) = {a}, ρ(S) = {a, b}, ρ(T ) = {a}, whereas
H[max , λ.] produces (R) = {b}, (S) = ∅, (T ) = {b} and ρ(R) = {a, b}, ρ(S) =
{a}, ρ(T ) = {a, b}. 
5 Conclusion
We have extended the ﬂow logic approach to static analysis: instead of merely spec-
ifying admissible solutions to analysis problems we additionally specify constraints
to be enforced on the admissible solutions. Our use of a simple syntactic distinc-
tion between soft assertions, R(x), and strong constraints, R!(x), have resulted in
very readable speciﬁcations, as was illustrated on a simple “typing example” for the
λ-calculus.
F. Nielson, H. Riis Nielson / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 172 (2007) 523–543 541
INPUT cls = cl1, · · · , clk and rank
s.t. cls ∈ F [rank ]
s.t. rank uses non-zero ranks only
OUTPUT (ρ, ) = (ρ1 ∪ · · · ∪ ρk), (1 ∪ · · · ∪ k)
METHOD i := 1; i := ⊥;
while i ≤ k do
ρ˜ := S(observe((cl1, · · · , cli)@(1 ∪ · · · ∪ i)));
b :=
V
RE∈RE (ρ˜(R
E) = ∅);
if b then ρ1 := (ρ˜ |R◦
1
); · · · ; ρi := (ρ˜ |R◦
i
); i := i + 1; i := ⊥;
else i := choose{j | ∃RE ∈ REj : ρ˜(R
E) 
= ∅}; i := i ∪ take(ρ˜ |RE
i
);
Table 4
The family of acceptable heuristics H[choose, take].
Our main contribution is the development of a heuristics that facilitates loosen-
ing some of the constraints in order for a security policy to hold for selected pro-
grams. The motivating example for this development has been the Bell-LaPadula
mandatory access control policy. Our strategy for loosening constraints has been to
keep the logical formulae unchanged but to admit more elements in the constrain-
ing predicates; we have generally referred to these as “spurious elements”. We have
studied and proposed heuristics for iteratively recomputing least solutions to anal-
ysis problems in such a way that the ﬁnal solution adheres to the constraints posed.
Also we have shown that a heuristics is all that can be hoped for.
It is worth pointing out that this inherently iterative procedure can still be for-
mulated in a logical setting; this distinguishes our approach from the rather ad-hoc
approach of [4, Algorithm 10]. The general mechanism facilitating our development
has been to use the rank-information to express the order of preference for adding
the “spurious elements”. We believe there to be a fair amount of ﬂexibility in the
choice of a ranking function rank for turning a stratiﬁable clause into a formula
that is stratiﬁed wrt. rank ; generally it should be possible to assign low ranks to
predicates recording simple observations from the program whereas the predicates
carrying the actual control ﬂow information may be so interdependent that they
alle need to get the same rank.
Further work is needed for determining the extent to which this approach is
applicable to other security features; possibilities include restricting the behaviour
of subjects inside the Trusted Computing Base and identifying the need for enlarging
the Trusted Computing Base.
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